Young children’s developing sensitivity to discourse continuity as a cue for inferring reference

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ABSTRACT

Children encounter many opportunities for word learning where a novel word (e.g., “chinchilla”) coincides in time with the presence of its referent (e.g., a parent pointing at a fuzzy rodent). These two ingredients are not always paired simultaneously, but they sometimes still occur in succession within a discourse. We investigated children's ability to apply their knowledge of discourse structure to infer the referent of a novel word in the absence of social cues such as pointing and eye gaze. In Experiment 1A, we introduced 2- to 6-year-old children and adults to two novel toys and described each using two sentences. We embedded the introduction of a novel label (“Have you seen a toma before?”) between the two sentences about one of the toys, with no cues implying the label's referent other than its position in the discourse. Children older than 3 years and adults were more likely to attribute the label to the toy whose descriptions surrounded the naming event. In Experiment 1B, we tested whether participants made their selections based on temporal associations—choosing the toy that was described closest in time to the naming event—rather than inferences about discourse. Participants heard the novel label introduced after the two descriptions of a toy rather than embedded between them. Both children and adults responded close to chance in this experiment, indicating that temporal proximity alone did not guide their selections. Together, these results suggest that children can use discourse position to make inferences about reference in word learning situations.

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Introduction

Children can use many strategies to learn new words. In overtly pedagogical situations, adults employ cues such as pointing and other signals of joint attention to establish reference. These ostensive cues can help children to learn word meanings (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Csibra, 2010; Hollich, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2000). Unambiguous ostensive cues, however, are not available at all times. For children to learn in more ambiguous situations, they must rely on other strategies to infer the meanings of novel words. Here we considered discourse structure—the order of utterances and how they relate to each other—as a cue. We focused particularly on discourse continuity, the idea that sentences in close succession are more likely to relate to the same topic. The current study measured children’s ability to use discourse continuity to make inferences about the referent of novel words in simple grounded contexts.

Children are exposed to information about discourse structure whenever they hear speech, and the simple linking of topics across sentences can provide a valuable source of information about the meanings of words. From an utterance such as

(1) I love chinchillas!

A child might not be able to infer what “chinchilla” means. But consider this same utterance as embedded in a short discourse:

(2) I got a new pet.
    I love chinchillas!
    They’re so soft.

The discourse structure in Example 2 might allow a child to make inferences that (a) a chinchilla is a kind of animal and (b) chinchillas are probably furry. This linking of information across a sequence of utterances requires that the child has some understanding of discourse structure. For inference (a), the child must assume that the statement in the second utterance is topically related to the first one; for inference (b), the child must assume that the pronoun in the third utterance co-refers to the noun in the second one.

Here we focus on inferences such as (a). We begin by discussing adults’ recognition of discourse structure cues and how these abilities may relate to children’s language processing. We then discuss links between these abilities and word learning. Our review of previous literature sets the stage for our experiment, which tests whether adults and children are able to make a simplified version of this inference using an assumption of discourse continuity to infer which object is referred to by a novel term.

Throughout this discussion, the perspective we take on word learning is that there are (at least) two problems that learners jointly solve (Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; McMurray, Horst, & Samuelson, 2012): (a) the problem of in-the-moment referential ambiguity and (b) the longer term problem of finding the conceptual extension of a word (even when its referent is known). We refer to the first problem as the problem of determining reference, and we refer to the second problem as the generalization problem. Although Example 2 highlights the potential of discourse information for both problems, here we focus on the role of discourse in referent selection.¹

¹ A somewhat orthogonal concern about calling this type of example word learning has to do with children’s retention of the referents they select. Some recent work indicates that although young children can use in-the-moment information to make inferences about reference, mappings inferred in this way are not necessarily retained (Bion, Borovsky, & Fernald, 2012; Horst & Samuelson, 2008). Our current work does not address long-term word learning but instead focuses on investigating children’s in-the-moment inferences about reference.
that the topic under discussion is in common ground and tend to refer back to it with elaborations, often reducing the reference to a pronoun or a shortened name. Linguists and computational linguists have explored a number of proposals for capturing the complex structures that appear in spoken and written discourses between adults (Asher & Lascarides, 2003; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1995; Hobbs, 1979; Kehler, 2002; Mann & Thompson, 1988; Polanyi, 1988; Wolf & Gibson, 2005). In the current context, we focus on a simpler operationalization of discourse as repeated mentions of the same referent (Frank, Tenenbaum, & Fernald, 2013; Rohde & Frank, 2014).

Some recent observational work suggests a possible role for discourse continuity in word learning. Frank et al. (2013) examined a video corpus of caregivers interacting with their 6- to 18-month-old children around pairs of toys. For each utterance, Frank and colleagues annotated what object the parent was looking at, pointing to, and talking about and found that the referent of the parent’s previous utterance was as strong a cue to the referent of the current utterance as was any individual social cue (e.g., pointing, the parent’s gaze). In other words, a child trying to guess the topic of the sentence would do well to assume continuity of reference between utterances to “smooth” the input from noisy and often irregularly used social cues.

In addition, other social and linguistic factors may mark discourse in child-directed speech. A follow-up to this first observational study tested whether findings on discourse structure in adults generalize to child-directed speech (Rohde & Frank, 2014). This study found that both the social cues that accompanied object references and the form of these references changed over the course of a topical discourse. Early on in the discourse, an object referent was more likely to be highlighted with social cues and referred to at the end of an utterance. In contrast, later references were less likely to be highlighted, were more pronominal, and were less likely to be in the final (“topic”) position in the utterance.

Complementing observational data that signal the presence of discourse information in child-directed speech, children also show sensitivity to conventions of continued reference within a discourse structure by 2 or 3 years of age. They are quite effective in tracking the shift from new to given in communications about grounded referents, and in their own productions their reference conventions and their choices of which labels to omit both show sensitivity to these features (Allen, 2000; Bates, 1976; Ciancy, 2004; Greenfield & Smith, 1976; Skarabela, 2007). Children also seem to be able to use the typical position of a first mention (at the end of an utterance, in the “topic position”) to infer the referent of an ambiguous pronoun (Hartshorne, Nappa, & Snedeker, 2014; Pyykkönen, Matthews, & Järvi, 2010; Song & Fisher, 2005; Song & Fisher, 2007), although evidence is somewhat mixed on this question (Arnold, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2007). This body of work as a whole suggests that children’s production and comprehension show substantial evidence of understanding basic discourse structure, although to our knowledge no studies link this knowledge to word learning specifically. Making this link was one of the goals of the current studies.

Finally, turning to the word learning literature, there is substantial evidence suggesting that children can incorporate speakers’ social and pragmatic cues—within a discourse even if discourse structure per se is not manipulated—to infer the intended referent of novel words. By 18 months of age, toddlers map novel labels to novel objects that the speaker attends to rather than what they themselves may be attending to even after a time delay (Baldwin, 1991; Baldwin, 1993). Young children apply new terms to the target of a speaker’s search (Tomasello & Barton, 1994) and appear to be able to track whether experiences have been shared with a partner to map a speaker’s introduction of new information to what is novel to that speaker (Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996; but see Samuelson & Smith, 1998; we discuss these studies in greater depth in the General Discussion). All of these findings suggest that children make inferences about the referents of novel words by assuming that speakers are using language to communicate about their own focus of attention. It is still unclear, however, what role discourse structure plays in these inferences.

The current study

The proposal that emerged from Frank et al.’s (2013) and Rohde and Frank’s (2014) studies was the assumption that ongoing topic information through discourse continuity might help children to connect social cues with labels even if the labels and cues do not co-occur in a single utterance. For example, consider the following (invented) utterance pair:
(3) Look at this! [speaker momentarily points at toy]
This one is a blicket.

Despite how obvious the pairing is between the two utterances, some sort of inference about continued reference in discourse (e.g., the ones described in Example 2) would still be necessary to lead a child to believe that the toy that was pointed to is a blicket. Although the observational data suggested this kind of inference as a possible mechanism for applying discourse structure to help in word learning, Frank and colleagues’ findings provided no evidence that children in the study actually could use this mechanism. The goal of our current study was to provide a test of this proposal.

We discuss two experiments investigating children’s and adults’ sensitivity to discourse continuity to resolve reference ambiguity (and, hence, to facilitate inferences about word meaning). In Experiment 1A, we show that children and adults can infer word meaning from sequentially offset social cues (as in Example 3) using information about discourse continuity. In Experiment 1B, we show that the results from Experiment 1A are not due to participants’ relying solely on temporal proximity as a cue to resolve ambiguity. Together, our findings suggest that language users are able to apply their knowledge about how utterances relate within a discourse to make inferences about speakers’ intended referents. This work suggests that children are not constrained to use social and contextual cues from individual utterances alone; rather, they can evaluate how information may relate across broader discourses and can use this information to infer word meanings.

Experiment 1A

We designed an experimental task to investigate children’s recognition of discourse structure as a cue to reference. We created trials with two minimal discourse topics, each consisting of two grouped sentences describing a single toy. We introduced participants (children aged 2–6 years and a comparison group of adults) to two novel toys at a time accompanied by only one novel label. We manipulated where in discourse the name was introduced, critically presenting the new label between the two descriptions of either the first toy or the second toy. We call this an embedded label because the introduction of the name is embedded between two descriptions of the same toy, thereby embedded within a topic. This design is pictured in Fig. 1 (top).

We were interested in which toy participants selected as the referent of the label. We predicted that if listeners were sensitive to how information relates within discourse structure, then they would be more likely to select the toy whose descriptions surrounded the naming event. Critically, because the experimenter made eye contact with the participant during the actual naming event and gave no gaze or gesture cues to the referent of the label, the only cue to the novel word’s referent was the location in which the name was introduced within the broader discourse. This design allowed us to examine listeners’ use of discourse information to resolve local referential ambiguity.

Method

Participants

A planned sample of 64 children was recruited from the Children’s Discovery Museum of San Jose in the western United States. Participants were uniquely identified by their birthdates to prevent repeat inclusion in the study. Children were given a sticker and a certificate as compensation for their participation. Parents were asked to fill out a short demographic form about their children’s language background, and only children who were reported to hear English at least 75% of the time were included in the study. An additional 7 children were recruited but excluded for not meeting this criterion: 3 children due to insufficient English exposure and 4 children whose language information was not reported.²

² As part of our partnership with the Children’s Discovery Museum, we invite any interested visitors to participate in our studies rather than prescreening children to meet our language requirements (Callanan, 2012). This standard to recruit inclusively also accounts for variability in gender counts across conditions.
Children were recruited in four age groups: 2-year-olds (n = 16, 12 girls and 4 boys, mean age = 2 years 7 months), 3-year-olds (n = 16, 4 girls and 12 boys, mean age = 3 years 6 months), 4-year-olds (n = 16, 6 girls and 10 boys, mean age = 4 years 5 months), and 5-year-olds (n = 16, 8 girls and 8 boys, mean age = 5 years 4 months).

We also recruited a comparison group of 12 adults from the museum, none of whom had children who participated in the study. Adults filled out a brief demographic form reporting their own language background, and only adults using English at least 75% of the time were included in the final sample. Only 1 additional participant was excluded for reporting less than this amount of English use.

**Stimuli**

Four pairs of unusual items (e.g., a faucet aerator and a spaghetti measure) served as the novel toys. An additional item (an oddly shaped funnel) was used for training. Pictures of the toys are given in Appendix A.

**Procedure**

Participants were seated across from the experimenter in a quiet room at the museum. Children participated in a training trial featuring ostensive labeling of a single toy (“This toy is called a blicket. Can you point to the blicket?”) to familiarize them with the design and to practice pointing before
seeing four discourse disambiguation trials. Adults participated in the four discourse disambiguation trials without undergoing the initial training.

For the discourse disambiguation trials, the experimenter placed a unique set of two toys on the table and described each in turn (see Fig. 1, top). In these Embedded trials, the experimenter introduced the naming event between two sentences about the same toy. The labels introduced in the four trials were “toma,” “modi,” “gazzer,” and “zib.” Each participant heard a naming event embedded between descriptions of the first toy for two of the trials (First Toy trials) and between descriptions of the second toy for two of the trials (Second Toy trials). Label location, trial order, toy pairs, and target side were counterbalanced across participants.

When describing a toy, the experimenter directed her gaze to the toy and demonstrated a feature of the toy. There was a brief pause between each sentence. For the naming event, she disengaged from the toy and maintained a neutral position while drawing participants’ attention by using their names and establishing eye contact. The experimenter did not give any gaze cues or other indicators to the referent of the novel name. Thus, the naming event in itself carried no information to guide disambiguation; the only cue available was its location within discourse. The toy pair remained in view of participants throughout the duration of the trial. At the end of each trial, the experimenter prompted participants to identify the named item by pointing (e.g., “Can you point to the toma? Which one is the toma?”). If children did not respond immediately, they were prompted again to make their best guess. The sessions were videotaped and coded offline. The entire task took approximately 5 minutes to complete.

**Results**

Despite the lack of coincident social cues to disambiguate the label, older children and adults were both overall much more likely to select the toy whose descriptions surrounded the naming event, suggesting that they can recognize and make inferences from discourse continuity. **Fig. 2** (left) illustrates the proportions of children and adults selecting the second toy as the referent of the label across trial types (whether the label was introduced with the first toy or the second toy). The 3-year-old group’s responses appeared to be sensitive to naming condition, and the 5-year-old group’s ability to use topic continuity in this paradigm was comparable to adult performance.
To measure the reliability of these patterns, we fit a generalized linear mixed effects model predicting second toy selection as an interaction between trial type (naming event with the first toy or second toy) and age with random effects of participant and trial type (the maximal structure appropriate for our experimental design; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Age was treated as a continuous variable. This model found no main effect of age and a trend toward a main effect of trial type, indicating that children and adults were overall somewhat more likely to select the second toy in Second Toy trials. The primary effect, however, was a significant interaction between age and trial type, indicating that participants’ reference selections by naming location increased with age. Coefficient estimates from these models are shown in Table 1 (left).

We also ran a series of paired t-tests to examine response differences between trial types for each age group (Table 2, left). Significant differences in reference selection were found across First Toy and Second Toy Embedded trial types for children aged 3 to 6 years.

Our results in Experiment 1A suggest that listeners are sensitive to discourse continuity to resolve reference ambiguity. By varying where a novel label was embedded within a topic, we found that older children and adults systematically selected the toy whose descriptions bracketed the naming event, suggesting that they were sensitive to where in the discourse the name was introduced. However, it is possible that listeners were using other heuristics to make their selections rather than relying on the discourse structure per se (Samuelson & Smith, 1998). To investigate this possibility, we ran a second experiment to dissociate discourse continuity from simpler associative strategies.

### Experiment 1B

Experiment 1A showed that children and adults chose the toy whose descriptions surrounded the naming events. A high-level explanation for this finding is that listeners assumed that these sentences formed part of a broader discourse about the toy. Nevertheless, the data are also consistent with a lower level explanation: Participants could be making a temporal association between the label and the toy descriptions rather than necessarily considering discourse structure. That is, participants could...
have been selecting the toy that was described nearest to the naming event in time, which in Experiment 1A would always correspond with the toy surrounding the introduction of the label in Embedded trials.

Experiment 1B was designed to rule out this particular version of a temporal proximity hypothesis. We made a slight modification to the scripts such that the naming event was moved to be introduced after descriptions of either the first toy or the second toy rather than embedded between descriptions of that toy. Thus, in these After trials, the naming event could occur next to descriptions of both toys in After First Toy trials or next to only the second toy in After Second Toy trials. A schematic of our design is shown in Fig. 1 (bottom).

This design allowed us to make the following predictions. If children relied on temporal association as a heuristic, then they would be at chance in the After First Toy trials (where the label can refer to either one or the other toy). In the After Second Toy trials, however, they would systematically select the second toy (because this is the only item that receives any attention from the speaker proximate to the naming event). In contrast, if children’s responses depended on discourse continuity information instead of temporal associations, then they would guess at chance in both trial types because the naming event always occurred after the discussion of a topic rather than being embedded within the topic.

**Method**

**Participants**

A new planned sample of 64 children was recruited from the Children’s Discovery Museum of San Jose. As before, children were recruited in four age groups: 2-year-olds ($n = 16$, 6 girls and 10 boys, mean age = 2 years 6 months), 3-year-olds ($n = 16$, 6 girls and 10 boys, mean age = 3 years 6 months), 4-year-olds ($n = 16$, 8 girls and 8 boys, mean age = 4 years 6 months), and 5-year-olds ($n = 16$, 10 girls and 6 boys, mean age = 5 years 5 months). An additional 5 children were excluded due to insufficient English exposure, 6 children were excluded because their language information was not reported, and 4 children were excluded for not completing all four trials of the study. In addition, as before, we recruited a group of 12 adults, all of whom reported using English at least 75% of the time and had not seen the study before. Birthdates and video records confirmed that none of our participants had taken part in Experiment 1A.

**Stimuli**

Stimuli were identical to those in Experiment 1A.

**Procedure**

The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1A with one minor change to the script of each trial: The location of the naming event was moved to occur after two descriptions of a toy rather than being embedded between the two descriptions. Thus, participants in Experiment 1B heard all of the same sentences and demonstrations as those in Experiment 1A. The only difference was the discourse location where the label was introduced; for two trials the label was introduced after descriptions of the first toy (After First Toy trials), and for two trials the label was introduced after descriptions of the second toy (After Second Toy trials).

**Results**

As predicted, children and adults were at chance in the After First Toy trials and showed only a weak bias to use temporal proximity to disambiguate reference in After Second Toy trials. Fig. 2 (right) illustrates the proportions of children and adults selecting the second toy as the referent of the label by naming location. Paired t-tests between reference selections across After First Toy and After Second Toy trials for each age group indicated that there were no significant differences in toy selection by trial type for any age group, although there was a trend toward such an effect in the 4-year-old group (Table 2, right).

Because predictions differed between After First Toy and After Second Toy trials, however, we also tested whether there was any temporal bias specifically in After Second Toy trials. We conducted
one-sample t-tests between means from participants in each group and chance. These tests revealed a different developmental pattern from results in the pairwise tests (and from results in Experiment 1A). Performance was reliable or close to reliable for 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds, \( t(15) = 2.09, 2.78, \) and \( 2.09, \) \( p_s = .054, .01, \) and \( .054, \) respectively. In contrast, performance for 5-year-olds and adults was not reliably different from chance, \( t(15) = 1.62 \) and \( 1.39, \) \( p_s = .13 \) and \( .19, \) respectively.

To analyze performance patterns across trial types, we fit a generalized linear mixed effects model as in Experiment 1A by predicting toy selection as an interaction between trial type and age with random effects of participant. There were no significant effects in the model, indicating that—given the level of power achieved in this study—we could not measure reliable differences in response between After First Toy and After Second Toy trials. Coefficient estimates from the model are shown in Table 1 (right). Taken together, our findings suggest that younger children might have been somewhat more likely than chance to rely on temporal association, but we cannot draw strong conclusions due to the lack of statistical differences between First Toy and Second Toy trial types.

To test whether participants’ performance in Experiment 1A could reliably be distinguished from participants’ performance in Experiment 1B, we also fit a combined generalized linear mixed effects model across the data from both experiments, adding experiment as an additional between-participants factor (Table 3). The only reliable effect in this model was a three-way interaction among experiment, trial type, and age, indicating that, with increasing age, children were more likely to select the first toy in First Toy trials and to select the second toy in Second Toy trials in Experiment 1A more than in Experiment 1B. This analysis confirms that the behavior and developmental trend we observed in Experiment 1A and attributed to use of discourse information was distinct (at least for older children) from the trends we observed in Experiment 1B attributed to temporal association.

General discussion

We investigated whether adults and children could use position in discourse as a cue to connect social information with an ambiguous label. In our experiments, adults made effective use of discourse position and children showed increasing sensitivity to discourse position with age. All age groups except 2-year-olds showed some evidence of using discourse position information. Taken together, our findings suggest a potential role for discourse continuity in helping children to use social information in otherwise ambiguous contexts and strengthen the argument that models of word learning should incorporate discourse information as a valuable cue to reference.

Possible alternative accounts of our findings

Here we discuss a number of alternative accounts of our findings in Experiment 1A. In particular, we address whether our results could have been due to the general temporal proximity of labels to referents, whether they could have been the result of a strategy of linking words to the most proximal previously mentioned referent, or whether they could have been due to differences in the number of referential comments prior to the labeling event (“weighted proximity”).
Could children have simply relied on temporal proximity to resolve local referential ambiguities? Our data clearly rule out this explanation. In particular, our After Second Toy trials in Experiment 1B presented only a single possible referent adjacent to the naming event. Despite the temporal proximity of the second toy to the labeling event, children showed only a weak bias to choose it in these trials. In addition, this bias was stronger for younger children, in contrast to the increased use of discourse information by older children. Thus, the data do not support a pure temporal proximity account.

Our results from the After trials rule out another possible account as well. According to this account, in the absence of social cues to meaning, children assume that the speaker's use of a novel label serves the goal of referring to the item she was just discussing (a “previous mention” bias, similar to temporal proximity but unidirectional). Children's behavior in the Embedded trials was consistent with this account; in Embedded trials, the target toy was described immediately before the experimenter provided a novel label. But in After First Toy trials, a “previous mention” account would have predicted an even stronger bias toward the first toy, which we did not observe.

A control study rules out one final alternative explanation—that hearing one versus two comments before the naming event (a difference between Experiments 1A and 1B) influenced participants’ inferences about reference, perhaps through some kind of weighted proximity of the label to the comments. We ran a version of Experiment 1A using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in which Embedded naming events occurred after one or two comments and were followed by yet another comment. We found no difference between these conditions, suggesting that results in our After trials in Experiment 1B were not due to the number of comments in a row but rather were due to the lack of discourse information. Details of this control experiment can be found in Appendix B. In sum, although temporal association or other proximity-related biases might have had some effects on the responses of our youngest participants, such accounts do not explain the pattern of data we observed.

A study by Akhtar and colleagues (1996) provides an interesting parallel here. These authors aimed to test whether children would be able to use discourse novelty to infer the reference of a novel word. In one of their experiments, 24-month-olds played with a set of novel toys along with two experimenters, E1 and E2. Then, after E2 left the room, E1 introduced and played with an additional new toy. On returning, E2 produced a novel name. Children later associated this label with the new toy. Akhtar and colleagues interpreted this finding as providing evidence that children assumed E2 was referring to the toy that had been introduced while she was away (the discourse novel target).

Follow-up work by Samuelson and Smith (1998) criticized this interpretation, however, and argued for an interpretation in which general contextual shifts (E2's entrance and exit) produced an effect on children's memory that was not specifically due to social information. We remain agnostic about the proper interpretation of Akhtar and colleagues’ (1996) finding, but we note that the tension between temporal and contextual associations, on the one hand, and discourse position, on the other, is a feature of our design as well—and perhaps a more general feature of discourses; they tend to create temporal proximity. In most contexts, discourse and temporal proximity are naturally confounded; it is only in specific experimental manipulations that they can be pulled apart. Thus, we view it as a strength of our work that Experiment 1B finds (weak) temporal association effects but that we are able to dissociate these from the (stronger) discourse effects we observed in Experiment 1A.

Conclusions and future directions

One open question raised by our results concerns the youngest children in our sample, who did not consistently use discourse position to disambiguate the reference of social cues (unlike the 2-year-olds in Akhtar et al., 1996). We do not believe, however, that our findings provide evidence against 2-year-olds’ ability to use discourse information to learn words more generally. Our paradigm was relatively complex and fast moving, involving attending closely to an experimenter across five distinct utterances in each of the unique trials, each with a new pair of objects. The attentional demands of the
paradigm, therefore, may have limited performance for the youngest children we tested. Eye movement-based measurements, combined with even stronger discourse contexts (e.g., Song & Fisher, 2005), might provide a method for measuring 2-year-olds’ performance in future work.

Because of the complexity of the factors involved in establishing reference in discourse context, computational models might in principle play a valuable role in helping to formalize the role of repeated references in children’s disambiguation and word learning. But despite the evidence on children’s discourse sensitivity, most models of word learning treat utterances as independent from one another in time, completely discarding any discourse information. For example, in the models of Siskind (1996), Yu and Ballard (2007), and Fazly, Alishahi, and Stevenson (2010), no mention is made of the connections between sentences as a possible source of information. Even a model that was
intended to capture the intentional nature of early word learning did not incorporate any assumption that communicative intentions would be related to one another across time (Frank et al., 2009).

One recent model, however, provides some hints. Building on Frank and colleagues (2009), Luong, Frank, and Johnson (2013) created a word learning model in which the speaker’s intended referent is continuous from sentence to sentence. This model incorporated social cues with discourse information and showed some modest improvements in word learning and reference resolution on the basis of including this information. Although this model provides some initial insights, it does not fully explore the potential of discourse information in more sophisticated referential situations. Further computational work is needed to understand when discourse information is most helpful for learners.

In sum, discourse continuity may provide the glue that holds together noisy social cues in a coherent referential structure, allowing children to aggregate information about what words mean across multiple utterances. Our work begins to address this idea by demonstrating that children are sensitive to discourse structure in simple referential contexts, and future work can build on these initial findings to examine the extent to which listeners incorporate cues to discourse continuity in their comprehension processing. The ability to make inferences about how sentences fit together could be a valuable learning mechanism. From learning that a chinchilla is a furry animal to picking up the subtle judgments expressed by the way people fit their sentences together, children’s ability to reason about meaning in discourse context may help them to use language to learn about the world around them.

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Appendix A. Materials

The full set of materials for our experiment is shown in Fig. A1.

Fig. A2. Results from Mechanical Turk control study manipulating the number of comments heard before the naming event using the stimuli from Experiment 1B. Plotting conventions are as in Fig. 2.
Appendix B. Control study

We conducted a control study ruling out the possibility that response differences between Experiments 1A and 1B came from hearing one versus two comments before the naming event. In the control, we ran an online version of our paradigm with 64 adults using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online crowd-sourcing service. Participants responded to a single trial in one of two possible conditions: Embedded naming event between two comments (identical to Experiment 1A) or Embedded naming event after two comments and before one comment (so that the comments prior to the naming event were matched to Experiment 1B but the comment following still qualified it as an Embedded trial here). Naming location, toy order, and side were counterbalanced across participants.

Results are plotted in Fig. A2. We found that adults were near ceiling in both naming conditions for selecting the first toy in First Toy trials (87% after one comment and 94% after two comments) and selecting the second toy in Second Toy trials (100% after one comment and 93% after two comments). These results suggest that participants’ performance in Experiments 1A and 1B were not due to the number of comments they heard in a row but rather were due to the naming event’s location within a discourse structure.

References


